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Abstract— The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear
systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously
controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive
signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier
work for continuous-time linear systems in [1], we term the
convergence of the estimates to the true states in the presence
of sensor attacks as ‘observability under M attacks’, where M
refers to the number of sensors which the attacker has access
to. Unlike the linear case, we only provide a sufficient condition
such that a nonlinear system is observable under M attacks.
The condition requires the existence of asymptotic observers
which are robust with respect to the attack signals in an input-
to-state stable sense. We show that an algorithm to choose a
compatible state estimate from the state estimates generated by
the bank of observers achieves asymptotic state reconstruction.
We also provide a constructive method for a class of nonlinear
systems to design state observers which have the desirable
robustness property. The relevance of this study is illustrated on
monitoring the safe operation of a power distribution network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cyber security of dynamical systems have garnered the
attention of our community in the past decade, see [2] and
[3] for a tutorial overview. This is indeed a timely concern as
the increasing (cyber) connectivity between physical systems
creates vulnerabilities where malicious cyber attacks can lead
to disastrous consequences.
The focus of this work is on the state estimation of
nonlinear dynamical systems where the sensors have been
compromised. This context has been studied in detail for
linear systems in both discrete [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10] and continuous-time [1], [11]. The main thread that
underlies achieving state reconstruction is characterizing the
number of sensors which are allowed to be attacked, and
the resulting algorithm is an optimization problem which is
combinatorial in nature. The computational complexity of
these algorithms are addressed in various ways including
transforming an l0 minimization problem into a convex
one [4], using gradient descent algorithms [5], employing
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers to reduce search
time [6] and reducing the number candidates [11], [10], [9],
[8], to name a few.
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Relatively little work has been done for nonlinear systems,
where algorithms were proposed for classes of nonlinear
systems in discrete-time [12], [13], [14] and in continuous-
time [15], [16]. Feedback linearizable systems are considered
in [13] and differentially flat systems in [12], which then
enables state estimation using linear techniques. The authors
of [14] consider Lur’e systems and employs the same frame-
work as in [1]. An adaptive observer is designed to estimate
both the states and the attack signals for asymptotically stable
nonlinear systems in [16]. In [15], a uniformly observable
nonlinear system is considered and a high gain observer
is designed for each measured output. An algorithm which
exploits redundancy then collects all the state estimates and
provides a state estimate.
In this paper, we consider a continuous-time nonlinear sys-
tem with N outputs where each is measured by a potentially
compromised sensor. Under the scenario where M out of
the N sensors have been maliciously manipulated, we aim
to reconstruct the states given that we do not know which
of the M sensors have been compromised. If this objective
is met, we call such a system observable under M attacks,
a term coined in our earlier work for linear systems [1].
We first provide a sufficient condition in Section IV for
observability under M attacks. The condition calls for the
total number of sensors N to be larger than twice the number
of attacked sensors M , i.e. N > 2M . Moreover, it also
requires an observer to be constructed for every combination
of N − 2M sensor measurements received by the observer,
with the crucial property that the observer is robust towards
the attack signals. In other words, each observer must have an
estimation error system which is input-to-state stable (ISS)
[17] with respect to the attack signals. These conditions are
consistent with the key results in the literature for linear
systems [4], [1] and a class of nonlinear systems [15].
This gives rise to an algorithm in Section V, which
employs the same framework proposed in an earlier work for
linear systems in [1] by some of the authors of this paper.
The algorithm uses a bank of observers designed to satisfy
the aforementioned properties and picks the state estimate
which satisfies a consistency measure involving a subset
of the other state estimates. The chosen state estimate is
shown to converge asymptotically to the true state, in the
presence of sensor attacks, provided that the system is M
attack observable.
In Section VI, we consider a class of nonlinear systems
and provide a systematic method for designing observers
which have the desired ISS property with respect to the
attack signal. This work is highly relevant in the remote
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
12
69
7v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
8 A
ug
 20
20
monitoring of the local voltage regulation of each customer
who is connected to a power distribution network, which
we present in Section VII. All proofs are provided in the
appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
• Let R = (−∞,∞), R≥0 = [0,∞), R>0 = (0,∞).
• Let the set of complex numbers be denoted by C.
• We denote the set of integers {i, i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , i+ k}
as N[i,i+k].
• The number of k-element subsets of an n-element set
is denoted
(
n
k
)
.
• Let (u, v) where u ∈ Rnu and v ∈ Rnv denote the
column vector (uT , vT )T .
• The cardinality of a set J is denoted as # (J ).
• The identity matrix of dimension n is denoted by In
and a matrix of dimension m by n with all elements 1
is denoted by 1m×n.
• A diagonal matrix with elements di, i ∈ N[1,n] is
denoted by diag(d1, d2, . . . , dn).
• Given a symmetric matrix P , its maximum (minimum)
eigenvalue is denoted by λmax(P ) (λmin(P )).
• The infinity norm of a vector x ∈ Rn, is denoted
|x| := max
i∈N[1,n]
|xi| and for a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, |A| :=
max
i∈N[1,n]
∑
j∈N[1,n]
|aij |, where aij is the row i-th and column
j-th element of matrix A.
• A continuous function α : R≥0 → R≥0 is a class
K function, if it is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0;
additionally, if α(r)→∞ as r →∞, then α is a class
K∞ function. A continuous function β : R≥0×R≥0 →
R≥0 is a class KL function, if: (i) β(., s) is a class K
function for each s ≥ 0; (ii) β(r, .) is non-increasing
and (iii) β(r, s)→ 0 as s→∞ for each r ≥ 0.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the problem of state observation for a class
of nonlinear systems under sensor attacks of the following
form
x˙ = f(x, z, w), z = (z1, z2, . . . , zN ),
zi = hi(x,w),
yi = zi + ai, i ∈ N[1,N ], (1)
where x ∈ Rnx is the state, yi ∈ Rni is the measured output
at sensor i, w ∈ Rnu is a measured input, f and hi are locally
Lipschitz functions and ai ∈ Rni is a possibly unbounded
attack signal that cannot be measured.
Assumption 1: Further assumptions about the attack sig-
nals ai are
(i) Sensors i ∈ N[1,N ] which are not under attack satisfy
ai(t) = 0, for all t ≥ 0.
(ii) Given an index set I ⊆ N[1,N ], the set of non-
attacked sensors remain constant, i.e. the attack vec-
tor a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈ NI , where NI :=
{(a1, a2, . . . , aN ) : ai(t) = 0,∀t ≥ 0,∀i 6∈ I}.
2
In this paper, we derive conditions such that the state x
of system (1) with N outputs can be estimated when M of
the sensors have been attacked, which we term observable
under M attacks and formally define below.
Definition 1: System (1) is observable under M attacks
if for any
• initial conditions x(0), x¯(0) ∈ Rnx ,
• measured input w ∈ Rnu ,
• index sets Ia, Ib ⊂ N[1,N ] with not more than M
elements,
• attack vectors a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈ NIa , a¯ =
(a¯1, a¯2, . . . , a¯N ) ∈ NIb ,
there exists an index set J ⊂ N[1,N ] with at least N −
2M elements, such that the output trajectories of system (1)
satisfy
αy (|x(0)− x¯(0)| , t)
≤ |yi (t;x(0), w, ai)− yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) |
≤ α¯y (|x(0)− x¯(0)|) ,
(2)
for all i ∈ J , t ≥ 0, and αy is a class KL function and α¯y
is a class K function. 2
We have denoted the output trajectories of system (1) initial-
ized at x(0) for the input w and attack ai as yi(t;x(0), w, ai),
for all i ∈ N[1,N ].
Definition 1 means that when a system (1) is observable
under M attacks, there is at most one initial condition in
which system (1) generates a compatible measured output
yi for any given input signal w, for at least N − 2M of
the measured outputs. This has to be achieved regardless of
which of the M sensors have been compromised and the
attack signal ai that has been chosen by the attacker.
IV. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR OBSERVABILTY
UNDER M ATTACKS
We provide a sufficient condition for system (1) to be
observable under M attacks.
Theorem 1: For any integer M ≥ 0, (ii) implies (i):
(i) System (1) is observable under M attacks.
(ii) N > 2M and, for every set J ⊂ N[1,N ] with # (J ) ≥
N − 2M , there exists a function fˆ : Rnx × R#(J ) ×
R#(J ) → Rnx such that the solution to
˙ˆxJ = fˆ (xˆJ , yJ , w) , (3)
and the solution to system (1), respectively satisfy
|x(t)− xˆJ (t)| ≤ βˆ (|x(0)− xˆJ (0)| , t)
+ γˆ
(
sup
s∈[0,t)
|aJ (s)|
)
, (4)
for all t ≥ 0 and initial conditions x(0), xˆJ (0) ∈ Rnx ,
where βˆ is a KL function, γˆ is a K∞ function, and aJ
denotes a stacked vector of ai indexed by i ∈ J .
2
Theorem 1 specifies that the number of available sensors
N has to be strictly more than twice the number of com-
promised sensors M . This is consistent with the results for
linear systems in [1] for continuous-time systems and [4]
for discrete-time systems, as well as in [15] and [14] for
classes of nonlinear systems in continuous and discrete-time,
respectively.
Further, condition (ii) means that the estimation error
eJ := x− xˆJ system constructed out of system (1) and (3)
is input-to-state stable (ISS) [17] with respect to the attack
vector aJ . This property can be fulfilled with Luenberger
observers in the case of linear systems (see [1, Section
III.B]), and with high gain observers [18] or circle criterion
observers [19] for classes of nonlinear systems. We will
provide a constructive example in our case study in Section
VI.
V. ALGORITHM
Using Theorem 1, we formulate the following estimation
algorithm to estimate the states of system (1) when M out
of N of its sensors have been compromised. Our algorithm
follows the idea presented in [1], where the results were
derived for linear dynamical systems.
The crux of the algorithm lies in the fact that for each
combination of N − M outputs (note that this is greater
than N − 2M outputs, which satisfies condition (ii) in
Theorem 1), there is one observer which receives attack-
free sensor outputs and hence provides state estimates that
converges to the true state. Further, for each set of these
N −M outputs, there is at least one subset consisting of
N − 2M outputs which is attack-free. Thus, the observer
which receives the attack-free subset of N − 2M outputs
will provide a state estimate which converge to the true
one. Therefore, in the algorithm presented in this section,
we employ two banks of observers: one bank of observers
employing N−M outputs, and the other employing N−2M
outputs.
Suppose that at most M out of N of system (1)’s outputs
can be compromised and condition (ii) of Theorem 1 holds.
Then, for every set S ⊂ N[1,N ] of N − M elements, an
observer which employs N −M outputs from system (1) is
constructed as follows
˙ˆxS = fˆ(xˆS , yS , w), (5)
which has an estimation error system that is ISS with respect
to the attack vector aS as stated in (4) of Theorem 1.
This forms the first bank of
(
N
N−M
)
observers. We define
the consistency measure piS to be the worst case deviation
between the estimate xˆS given by (5) and the estimate xˆP
generated in the same manner as (5) for P ⊂ S with N−2M
elements, which is
piS(t) = maxP⊂S:#(P)=N−2M
|xˆS(t)− xˆP(t)| . (6)
For the set S in which all the attack vectors are zero, i.e.
ai(t) = 0, for all i ∈ S and t ≥ 0, all the state estimates xˆS
and xˆP will be consistent and this motivates the choice of
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Fig. 1. Infrastructure of a secure state estimation algorithm for nonlinear
systems (1).
the state estimate xˆ produced by the algorithm as follows
xˆ(t) = xˆσ(t)(t),
σ(t) = arg min
S⊂N[1,N]:#(S)=N−M
piS(t). (7)
We summarize the algorithm (5), (6), (7) in Figure 1 and
provide the following state estimation convergence guaran-
tees.
Theorem 2: Consider system (1) with N -outputs of which
at most M is compromised, i.e. the attack vector a belongs to
NI , for some set I ⊂ N[1,N ] where #(I) ≤ M . Assuming
that (ii) of Theorem 1 holds, then there exists a class KL
function β˜ such that the solution to system (1) and the secure
state estimation algorithm (5), (6), (7) satisfy
|x(t)− xˆ(t)| ≤ β˜ (|x(0)− xˆ(0)| , t) , ∀t ≥ 0, (8)
for any initial conditions x(0), xˆS(0), xˆP(0) ∈ Rnx . 2
VI. CASE STUDY: A CLASS OF NONLINEAR SYSTEMS
We consider a specific form of system (1) as follows:
x˙ = Ax+ φ(z), φ(z) = (φ1(z1), φ2(z2), . . . , φN (zN )) ,
zi = Hix+ wi, i ∈ N[1,N ],
yi = zi + ai, (9)
where the nonlinearities φi : Rni → R are slope-restricted,
i.e.
Assumption 2: For i ∈ N[1,N ], the nonlinearity φi satisfies
di ≤
φi(ξ)− φi(ψ)
ξ − ψ ≤ d¯i, ∀ξ, ψ ∈ R, ξ 6= ψ. (10)
2
For system (9) with N outputs, of which M can be
compromised, we show that (ii) of Theorem 1 is satisfied
by designing each observer (3) in the following manner for
every set J ⊂ N[1,N ].
˙ˆxJ = AxˆJ + φ(ξJ ) + o¯(LJ , yJ , xˆJ , wJ ),
ξJ = HxˆJ + w + o¯(KJ , yJ , xˆJ , wJ ), (11)
where o¯(KJ , yJ , xˆJ , wJ ) = KJ (yJ − (HJ xˆJ + wJ )) is
an output injection term employing outputs yJ , known inputs
wJ and an observer matrix KJ to be designed. Note that
the first two terms in ξJ use the full H from system (9) and
all the known inputs w, respectively.
Proposition 1: Consider system (9) under Assumption 2.
Suppose N > 2M and, for every set J ⊂ N[1,N ] with
# (J ) ≥ N − 2M , there exist a matrix PJ = PTJ > 0,
scalars νJ ≥ 0, µJ ≥ 0 and observer matrices KJ and LJ
such that the following holds A (PJ , PJLJ , νJ ) B (PJ ,KJ ) −PJB (PJ ,KJ )T D(d¯) 0
−PJ 0 −µJ InJ
 ≤ 0,
(12)
where
• A (PJ , PJLJ , νJ ) :=
PJ (A− LJHJ ) + (A− LJHJ )T PJ + νJ Inx ,
• B (PJ ,KJ ) := PJ + (H −KJHJ )T ,
• D(d¯) := −2 diag (d¯−11 , d¯−12 , . . . , d¯−1N ),
• nJ :=
∑
i∈J
ni.
Then, (ii) of Theorem 1 holds. 2
Inequality (12) is a linear matrix inequality (LMI) in PJ ,
PJLJ , νJ , KJ and µJ , which can be solved efficiently
using computational tools. The design we have used here
was first introduced as the circle criterion observer in [19],
which can be tuned to attenuate measurement noise and input
disturbances according to the design in [20]. Here, we have
adapted the design such that the observer (11) is robust with
respect to the attack vector aJ in the sense of (4).
VII. APPLICATION: SECURE MONITORING FOR THE
VOLTAGE REGULATION OF A POWER DISTRIBUTION
NETWORK
A typical low voltage power distribution network (shown
in Figure 2) would consist of N customers feeding into the
distribution network in a line configuration, with the smart
secondary substation at the head of the line. The substation
functions as a monitoring center, sending the desired set-
point voltage v¯ to each local controller Σi, such that the
voltages received by each customer vi is regulated to operate
in a safe operating range, i.e. for a given δ > 0,
v¯ − δ ≤ vi(t) ≤ v¯ + δ, ∀t ≥ 0. (13)
For each customer i ∈ N[1,N ], the received voltage level is
vi and the voltage level at the point of connection with the
distribution line is v′i, with a corresponding line impedance
Z ′i = R
′
i + jX
′
i in between customer i and the connection
point on the distribution line, where R′i ∈ R≥0 is the
resistance and X ′i ∈ R≥0 is the reactance. In between each
connection point, the corresponding line impedance is Zi =
Ri+jXi, where Ri ∈ R≥0 is the resistance and Xi ∈ R≥0 is
the reactance. Each customer has a load which can consume
reactive qc,i and active powers ρc,i, independently of the
generated reactive qg,i and active powers ρg,i.
In [21], a class of sector-bounded droop controllers Σi
which uses local measurements vi were shown to regulate
the voltages vi such that the safety constraint (13) is satisfied.
This is achieved via appropriate injection of reactive power
qg,i by each local controller Σi to regulate the flow of active
Pi and reactive Qi powers, under the assumption that the
net injected active power ρi and the reactive power qc,i
consumed by customer i is bounded and the bounds are
known.
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Fig. 2. Infrastructure of a low-voltage grid. Voltage regulation is achieved
via local controllers Σi, for i ∈ N[1,N ], with the monitoring center (situated
at the substation) receiving potentially corrupted measurements of vi.
We are now concerned with the security problem where
the measurements of the voltages vi received at the moni-
toring center situated at the substation has been maliciously
corrupted. We model this measurement corruption with an
additive attack signal αi : R≥0 → R which is potentially
unbounded, as follows
yˆi = vi + αi. (14)
This is a major issue as the presence of the attack signal
αi would mislead the monitoring center into thinking that
the safety constraint (13) has been violated and thus a false
alarm is raised and possibly triggering unwarranted operator
actions.
Our solution is to employ the results in the previous
sections to estimate the voltages vi, given that M out of
N of the measurements yi are maliciously manipulated. To
this end, we model the power flow in the distribution grid as
done in [21] using the linearized DistFlow model [22] and
assume that the droop controllers Σi have been designed
using the methodology presented in [21]. The relationship
between the power flow and voltages between key nodes is
Pi+1 = Pi + ρi+1,
Qi+1 = Qi + qi+1,
v′i+1
2
= v′i
2 − 2βi(Pi, Qi),
v′i
2
= vi
2 − 2β′i−1(ρi, qi),
(15)
where Pi and Qi are the respective total active and reactive
powers flowing from customer i to customer i + 1; ρi :=
ρg,i − ρc,i and qi := qg,i − qc,i are the net injection of the
respective active and reactive power into the distribution line
from customer i; βi(r, s) := Rir + Xis and β′i(r, s) :=
R′ir +X
′
is with β
′
−1(r, s) = 0 for all r, s ∈ R.
Each local controller Σi actuated by the inverter can
generate reactive power qg,i as follows
q˙g,i = − 1
τi
qg,i +
1
τi
Ki(v¯
2 − v2i ), (16)
where τi ∈ R>0 is the time-constant of the inverter’s
response, v¯ ∈ R is the reference voltage communicated
to each customer i and the droop function Ki(w) is a
static mapping from the difference of the squared voltages
w to the set-point for the reactive power. We choose the
droop function Ki(w) to be a piecewise saturation function
considered in [23] which takes the following form:
Ki(w) :=

−Q¯i, w ≤ wmin,i,
−
(
1− w−wmin,iwm,i−wmin,i
)
Q¯i w ∈ (wmin,i, wm,i],
0, w ∈ (wm,i, wn,i],(
w−wn
wmax,i−wn,i
)
Q¯i w ∈ (wn,i, wmax,i],
Q¯i, w > wmax,i,
(17)
where wmin,i ≤ wm,i ≤ 0 ≤ wn,i ≤ wmax,i are design
parameters, Q¯i ∈ R≥0 is the saturation limit of the i-th
inverter satisfying Q¯i =
√
s¯2i − ρ2g,i, where s¯i ∈ R is the
maximum apparent power of the i-th inverter. The design
parameters wmin,i, wmax,i, wm,i, wn,i are chosen such that
di := min
{
Q¯i
wmax,i−wn,i ,
Q¯i
wm,i−wmin,i
}
(18)
satisfies [21, Theorem 6] such that the safety constraint (13)
is met. We employ the same change in state coordinates as
done in [21] such that the distribution model (15), controllers
(16), and measurements received at the monitoring center
(14) can be written in the form of (9) by choosing
• the state x = (qg,1, qg,2, . . . , qg,N ),
• zi := v¯2 − v2i ,
• the known input wi = φi(ρ, qc) + v¯2 − v′20,
where φi(ρ, qc) :=
∑
j∈N[0,i−1]
ψj(ρ, qc) +∑
j∈N[0,i−2]
2β
′
j(ρj+1, qc,j+1) and
ψj(ρ, qc) := 2Xj
∑
k∈N[j+1,N]
qc,k − 2Rj
∑
k∈N[j+1,N]
ρk
− 2β′j(ρj+1, qc,j+1),
where β′j is from (15),
• the attack signal ai = 2viαi−α2i , where αi comes from
(14),
• Hi to be the rows of the matrix
H = −2

X0 X0 . . . X0
? (X0 +X1) . . . (X0 +X1)
...
. . . . . .
...
? . . . ?
∑
i∈N[0,N−1]
Xi

− 2diag (X ′0, . . . , X ′N−1) ,
where ? denotes a block component of a symmetric
matrix,
• A = diag (−1/τ1,−1/τ2, . . . ,−1/τN ),
• φi(zi) = τ−1i Ki(zi), which satisfies Assumption 2 with
di = 0 and d¯i = di/τi, where di is defined in (18).
To recapitulate, given that the monitoring center sits
remotely at the substation, the objective is to estimate the
voltages vi, given that the monitoring center only has access
to the measurements yi, i ∈ N[1,N ], where M out of N of
these measurements may be corrupted. The main idea is to
first estimate the states x of all the controllers Σi, i ∈ N[1,N ],
then estimate the voltages vi via
vˆi(t)
2 = −Hixˆ(t)− ψi(ρ, qc) + v′20, (19)
where xˆ is the state estimate provided by the secure estima-
tion algorithm described in Section V; ψ and v′20 are known.
We have kept the squared form of the voltage vˆ2i due to
the distribution model (15) used. We provide the following
guarantee.
Proposition 2: Consider the distribution model (15) and
controllers (16) with measurements (14) where aI belongs
to NI for some unknown set I ⊂ N[1,N ] with at most M
elements. Suppose N > 2M and for every J ⊂ N[1,N ] with
# (J ) ≥ N − 2M , there exist a matrix PJ = PTJ > 0,
scalars ν ≥ 0, µa ≥ 0 and observer matrices KJ and LJ
such that (12) holds. Then, using the secure state estimation
algorithm (5), (6), (7), the estimated squared voltages vˆ2i
computed according to (19) converges to to the true squared
voltages v2i as follows∣∣vi(t)2 − vˆi(t)2∣∣ ≤ βv (|x(0)− xˆ(0)| , t) , (20)
for all t ≥ 0, i ∈ N[1,N ], initial conditions qg,i(0) ∈
R, where x(0) = (qg,1(0), qg,2(0), . . . , qg,N (0)), xˆ(0) =
(qˆg,1(0), qˆg,2(0), . . . , qˆg,N (0)) and βv is a class KL function.
2
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced a new definition of observability for nonlin-
ear systems in which a subset of the outputs can be manipu-
lated maliciously. A sufficient condition such that asymptotic
state reconstruction can be achieved in the presence of
sensor attacks is provided, which requires building a bank
of observers with an ISS property. A secure state estimation
algorithm is proposed which shows that the framework used
for linear continuous time systems in our earlier work [1]
can be used for nonlinear systems as well. A systematic
method for designing the observers is proposed for a class of
nonlinear systems and we showed the relevance of this work
in the monitoring of a power distribution network. Future
work includes reducing the computational resources needed
in terms of time and number of observers required.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
(ii) implies (i): Suppose to the contrary that (ii) is true, but
(i) is false, i.e. there exist initial conditions x(0), x¯(0) ∈ Rnx ,
sets Ia, Ib ⊂ N[1,N ] where # (Ia) ≤ M and # (Ib) ≤ M ,
input w and attack vectors a ∈ NIa , a¯ ∈ NIb and an index
set J ⊂ N[1,N ] with # (J ) ≥ N − 2M such that for all
i ∈ J
|yi (t;x(0), w, ai)− yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) |
> α¯y (|x(0)− x¯(0)|) , ∀t ≥ 0, (21)
and/or
|yi (t;x(0), w, ai)− yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) |
< αy (|x(0)− x¯(0)| , t) , ∀t ≥ 0,
(22)
where αy is a KL function and α¯ is a K∞ function.
First, note that the solution to (1) satisfies the following
for i ∈ N[1,N ]
|yi(t;x(0),w, ai)− yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) |
≤ li |x(t;x(0), w, ai)− x(t; x¯(0), w, a¯i)| , (23)
where li ≥ 0 is the Lipschitz constant of the output function
hi from system (1).
Consider the index set J := N[1,N ]/{Ia∪Ib}, where ai =
0 and a¯i = 0, for all i ∈ J . We can view x(t; x¯(0), w, a¯i)
as a solution to (3) with fˆ (xˆJ , yJ |aJ=0, w) = f(x, z, w),
which is a copy of system (1)’s dynamics, initialized at x¯(0).
Using (ii), we have from (23) that for all i ∈ J
|yi (t;x(0), w, ai)− yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) |
≤ αi (|x(0)− x¯(0)|) , ∀t ≥ 0, (24)
where αi(r) := liβˆ(r, 0) is a K∞ function and βˆ is
a KL from (ii). According to (24), |yi (t;x(0), w, ai) −
yi (t; x¯(0), w, a¯i) | = 0 when |x(0) − x¯(0)| = 0, which
contradicts (21) and (22). Therefore, (ii) implies (i).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Let I¯ := N[1,N ]\I and consider the consistency measure
for the set I¯.
piI¯(t) = maxP⊂I¯:#(P)=N−2M
|xˆI¯(t)− xˆP(t)|
= max
P⊂I¯:#(P)=N−2M
|xˆI¯(t)− x(t) + x(t)− xˆP(t)|
≤ |xˆI¯(t)− x(t)|+ maxP⊂I¯:#(P)=N−2M |x(t)− xˆP(t)| .
(25)
Note that ai(t) = 0, for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I¯. Further, for
every P ⊂ I¯, where #(P) = N − 2M , we also have that
ai(t) = 0, for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ P . Therefore, by assumption
that (4) of Theorem 1 holds, we have that for any X ⊂ N[1,N ]
(either X = I¯ or X = P)
|xˆX (t)− x(t)| ≤ βX (|xˆX (0)− x(0)| , t) , ∀t ≥ 0,
(26)
for all xˆX (0), x(0) ∈ Rnx , where βX is a class KL function.
We also observe that for every set S with #(S) = N−M ,
we have at least one set P¯ ⊂ S with #(P¯) = N−2M where
ai(t) = 0, for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ P¯ . Hence, assuming that (4)
of Theorem 1 is satisfied, we have that
|xˆP¯(t)− x(t)| ≤ βP¯ (|xˆP¯(0)− x(0)| , t) , ∀t ≥ 0,
(27)
for all xˆP¯(0), x(0) ∈ Rnx , where βP¯ is a class KL function.
Moreover, using the fact that
piσ(t)(t) = maxP⊂σ:#(P)=N−2M
∣∣xˆσ(t)(t)− xˆP(t)∣∣
≥ ∣∣xˆσ(t) − xˆP¯(t)∣∣ , (28)
we obtain∣∣x(t)− xˆσ(t)(t)∣∣ = ∣∣x(t)− xˆP¯ + xˆP¯ − xˆσ(t)(t)∣∣
≤ |x(t)− xˆP¯ |+
∣∣xˆP¯ − xˆσ(t)(t)∣∣
≤ |x(t)− xˆP¯ |+ piσ(t)(t)
≤ |x(t)− xˆP¯ |+ piI¯(t),
(29)
where we have obtained the second to last inequality with
(28) and the last inequality by definition of piσ(t).
Therefore, using (25), (26) and (27),∣∣x(t)− xˆσ(t)(t)∣∣ ≤ βP¯ (|xˆP¯(0)− x(0)| , t)
+βI¯ (|xˆI¯(0)− x(0)| , t)
+β¯P (|xˆP(0)− x(0)| , t) .
(30)
where β¯ := max
P⊂I¯:#(P)=N−2M
βP which is also a KL func-
tion.
By a property of class KL functions [24, Lemma 5.3], we
know that there exist class K∞ functions αP¯ , αI¯ and αP ,
as well as positive constants λP¯ , λI¯ and λP > 0 such that∣∣x(t)− xˆσ(t)(t)∣∣ ≤ αP¯ (|xˆP¯(0)− x(0)|) e−λP¯ t
+αI¯ (|xˆI¯(0)− x(0)|) e−λI¯t
+αP (|xˆP(0)− x(0)|) e−λP t, ∀t ≥ 0.
(31)
Hence, we obtain (8) as desired with β˜ :=
3 max {αP¯ (|xˆP¯(0)− x(0)|) , αI¯ (|xˆI¯(0)− x(0)|) ,
αP (|xˆP(0)− x(0)|)} e−λt, where λ := min {λP¯ , λI¯ , λP}.
C. Proof of Proposition 1
Let the state estimation error for every set J ⊂ N[1,N ] be
x˜J := x− xˆJ . The state estimation error system is
˙˜xJ = (A− LJHJ ) x˜J + φ(z)− φ(ξJ )− LJ aJ . (32)
Since the nonlinearity φ satisfies Assumption 2, there exists
δi(t) ∈
[
di, d¯i
]
, for i ∈ N[1,N ] such that
φ(z)− φ(ξJ ) = δ(t)ηJ − δ(t)KJ aJ ,
where δ(t) := diag (δ1(t), δ2(t), . . . , δN (t)) and ηJ :=
(H −KJHJ ) x˜J . Then the state estimation error system
is
˙˜xJ = (A− LJHJ ) x˜J + δ(t)ηJ − (δ(t)KJ + LJ ) aJ .
(33)
We are now ready to show that observer (11) satisfies
(4) of Theorem 1 using a candidate Lyapunov function
VJ (x˜J ) = x˜TJPJ x˜J , where PJ = P
T
J > 0 satisfies (12).
The time derivative of VJ (x˜J ) along the solutions of the
state estimation error system (33) is
V˙ (x˜J ) = χTJ
 PJ A˜J + A˜TJPJ PJ −PJPJ 0 0
−PJ 0 0
χJ ,
(34)
where χJ = (x˜J , δ(t)ηJ , (δ(t)KJ + LJ ) aJ ) and A˜J :=
A− LJHJ .
Applying (12), we obtain
V˙ (x˜J ) ≤− νJ |x˜J |2 − 2ηTJ δ(t)ηJ
+ 2ηTJ δ(t)
T diag
(
1/d¯1, 1/d¯2, . . . , 1/d¯N
)
δ(t)ηJ
+ µa |δ(t)KJ + LJ |2 |aJ |2 . (35)
We first examine the second and third terms on the right
hand side of the inequality component by component, i.e.
for i ∈ N[1,N ], δi(t) − δi(t)2/d¯i = δi(t)
(
1− δi(t)/d¯i
) ≥
0, as δi(t) > 0 and 1 − δi(t)/d¯i ≥ 0 by Assumption 2.
Next, |δ(t)KJ + LJ |2 ≤ 2 |δ(t)KJ |2 + 2 |LJ |2 by Young’s
inequality and we obtain
V˙ (x˜J ) ≤− νJ |x˜J |2 + µa
(
2d¯2 |KJ |2 + 2 |LJ |2
)
|aJ |2 ,
(36)
where d¯ := max
{
d¯1, d¯2, . . . , d¯N
}
.
By noting that VJ (x˜J ) can be sandwiched as follows
λmin (PJ ) |x˜J |2 ≤ VJ (x˜J ) ≤ λmax (PJ ) |x˜J |2 , (37)
and using the comparison principle, the solution to (36)
satisfies
V (x˜J ) ≤ e−λJ tV (x˜J (0)) + αJ
∫ t
0
e−λJ (t−s) |aJ (s)|2 ds,
(38)
where λJ := νJ /λmax(PJ ), αJ :=
2µa
(
d¯2 |KJ |2 + |LJ |2
)
/λmax (PJ ). Since∫ t
0
e−λJ (t−s)ds =
(
1− e−λJ t) /λJ ≤ 1/λJ , we obtain
V (x˜J ) ≤ e−λJ tV (x˜J (0)) + αJ /λJ sup
s∈[0,t]
|aJ (s)|2 .
(39)
By applying (37) again, we obtain (4) as desired with
βˆ(r, t) =
√
λmax(PJ )
λmin(PJ )
e−
λJ
2 t.r and γˆ(r) :=
√
αJ
λJ λmin(PJ )
r.
D. Proof of Proposition 2
From (15), (16) and (19), we have for i ∈ N[1,N ]∣∣v2i (t)− vˆ2i (t)∣∣ ≤ |Hi| |x(t)− xˆ(t)| ,
≤ |Hi| β˜ (|x(0)− xˆ(0)| , t) , t ≥ 0,
(40)
where we obtain the last inequality according to Proposition
1 and Theorem 2, and β˜ is a class KL function from Theorem
2. Hence, we have shown (20) with βv(r, s) = |Hi| β˜(r, s).
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